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The disease now threatening our society is almost unprecedented in
human history. It does not discriminate and is so widespread that it af-
fects all countries and all people. If you think that it is Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS),I you are wrong. AIDS is a terrible
threat, but it can be controlled. Unfortunately, however, nothing pre-
vents the spread of the Acute FeaR of AIDS, or AFRAIDS. It is this
AIDS hysteria that is the truly great danger to society.
Americans are more fearful today than they were in the early twenti-
eth century when polio crippled so many. At that time, the fear had
some basis. Polio spread from child to child, and for a long time no one
knew how. AIDS is incurable, 2 but its means of transmission is well un-
derstood. It spreads from person to person only when bodily fluids,
blood or sexual secretions are shared.
3
The cure for AIDS hysteria, and for AIDS itself, is the understand-
ing, enlightenment and modification of behavior that will come with
learning the truth about the disease. We can reduce the fear of AIDS by
educating people about how to prevent the spread of the disease-most
transmissions are preventable 4-and by dispelling the myth that AIDS is
* Associate Professor, College of Education, Cleveland State University.
1. AIDS is a disease of the immune system. It destroys the body's ability to combat
certain opportunistic infections and cancers. For a more complete description of the dis-
ease, see AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, LEGAL, MEDICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS
AS A DISABILITY (David Rapoport et al. eds., 1987) [hereinafter PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS].
2. AIDS fatality figures are often presented in an inadvertently misleading manner.
At any given moment, the total number of reported cases of AIDS is much larger than the
total number of people who have died from the disease. Thus, if a report states that 9,000
deaths have occurred out of 18,000 reported cases, the inference is that only half of those
who develop AIDS will die as a result of the disease. Yet, the truth is that the 9,000 victims
who are still alive are simply the more recent cases. Eventually they too will die. Robert
Roden, Note, Educating Through the Law: The Los Angeles AIDS Discrimination Ordinance, 33
UCLA L. REV. 1410, 1416 n.48 (1986).
By 1986, 25,000 known AIDS victims had died. By November 10, 1991, 202,843 cases
of AIDS had been reported, resulting in 130,687 deaths. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
AIDS WEEKLY SURVEILLANCE REPORT (November 30, 1991). Statistics are available from
the Centers for Disease Control by telephone at (404) 330-3020. These numbers un-
doubtedly will continue to increase. AIDS is the most severe disease that has ever affected
mankind.
3. ROBERTA WEINER, AIDS: IMPACT ON THE SCHOOLS 10 (1986). The virus is easily
killed outside the body, since it is more fragile than bacteria, and can be destroyed by
common disinfectants such as bleach and Lysol. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, RECOM-
MENDATIONS FOR PREVENTING THE TRANSMISSION OF AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE, INCLUDING
SCHOOLS (reproduced in WEINER, supra at 135, 146). See also PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS, supra
note 1. at 3 (stating that intact skin is an absolute barrier to the AIDS virus).
4. PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 8.
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exclusively the disease of homosexuals and intravenous (IV) drug users.
AIDS is now a global problem, and its victims come from all levels and
segments of society.
5
Compounding the problem is the fact that an increasingly dispro-
portionate number of AIDS victims in the United States are members of
minorities, especially children. Blacks and Hispanics account for over
forty percent of reported AIDS cases.
6
This Article examines the impact of AIDS on schools and on the
lives of school children. The discussion focuses on recent developments
in AIDS law and the effects of these developments on primary and sec-
ondary public education, where the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
of due process and equal protection attach directly. It analyzes state and
local statutes 7 and AIDS policies, as well as national policies such as
those recommended by the Centers for Disease Control, in light of med-
ical research, economics, politics and the United States Constitution. It
also discusses discrimination against the handicapped, statutory enact-
ments, mandatory testing, board of education rules, the authority of de-
partments of health and other school district issues. The Article closes
with a series of recommendations regarding AIDS education in the
schools.
I. SCHOOL CHILDREN WITH AIDS
A. Incidence and Means of Transmission
The number of AIDS cases among boys and girls who were under
thirteen when they contracted the disease is growing at an alarming rate.
The Centers for Disease Control reported 3,426 cases among children
as of November 30, 1991.8 Nearly one-fourth of these children acquired
the disease through IV drug use or sexual contact. Most children with
AIDS, however, contracted it in utero.9 This suggests that at least one
parent was an IV drug user with AIDS. As IV drug use increases, result-
ing in more AIDS cases, the number of children with AIDS is also likely
to increase.
Pre-school children who have Human Immune Deficiency Virus
(HIV)-the virus that causes AIDS-acquired it in one of two ways: they
were born to infected mothers' ° or they received infusions of infected
5. Although linked in the United States with male homosexuals, who were its pri-
mary victims at first, AIDS has been discovered in heterosexuals, infants, women and mi-
norities. Roden, supra note 2, at 1413.
6. Centers for Disease Control, supra note 2. See also Samuel R. Friedman et al., The
AIDS Epidemic Among Blacks and Hispanics, 65 MILBANK Q. 455 (1987).
7. Ohio education statutes, which are similar to those of many other states, will be
used in this Article to illustrate state policy regarding AIDS in the schools.
8. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, supra note 2.
9. Laurence Lavin et al., Health Benefits: How the System is Responding to Aids, 22
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 724 (1988) [hereinafter Health Benefits].
10. HIV can be transmitted only under very specific conditions. Carried in the blood,
it is most often spread through sexual contact or the use of infected IV needles. It can also
be transmitted from an infected mother to a fetus developing in utero or to a newborn
infant. The most direct means of exposure to infected blood is a blood transfusion. PER-
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blood. I ' Most AIDS cases transmitted this way are diagnosed by age
two.12 Children born with the virus may become ill, periodically, with
one of the physical conditions associated with AIDS, such as a depressed
immune system.' 3 Many die less than a year after they are attacked by
an opportunistic infection, but some ultimately recover and remain well.
There is no reason why a child whose physical stamina is excellent
should not be allowed to remain in school with his or her unaffected
peers. 14
The argument usually made for keeping children with AIDS out of
school is that they will spread the disease to others. The only valid argu-
ment, however, is that the child with AIDS needs protection. The
chance that a classmate or school employee will "catch" AIDS is negligi-
ble compared with the chance that the student with AIDS will "catch" an
opportunistic infection like a cold, or any other germ, and die. 15
Much of the fear that school children will infect their peers centers
on the possibility that a sick child will bite a healthy one. 16 The medical
consensus, however, is that biting is an unlikely route of transmission.
The concentration of the virus is low in saliva, and young children have
a minimum capacity to penetrate the skin deeply enough for the virus to
enter the circulatory system through the wound. 17 In fact, no record
exists of a child having received HIV from another child, either at home
SPECTIVE ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 4; AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE FOR THE PUBLIC
(Harlon L. Dalton et al. eds., 1987) at 31 [hereinafter AIDS AND THE LAW].
11. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 24.
12. WEINER, supra note 3, at 19.
13. AIDS-affected individuals include asymptomatic carriers, persons with AIDS-Re-
lated Complex (ARC) and persons with AIDS. Asymptomatic carriers of the HIV virus-
those in whom the virus is dormant-are extremely dangerous because they have no rea-
son to believe they are infected. They do not change their behavior and may unknowingly
transmit the disease to others. The Centers for Disease Control estimate that more than
one million people are asymptomatic carriers of the virus. WEINER, supra note 3, at 14.
Persons with ARC have symptoms indicating lowered immunity, such as weight loss,
fatigue and swollen lymph nodes. ARC can eventually develop into a full-blown case of
AIDS. Persons with AIDS are unable to resist infection because their immune systems are
affected by opportunistic diseases such as pneumocystis pneumonia, tuberculosis and
Karposi's sarcoma, a type of cancer that attacks the skin and then spreads to the lymph
nodes, lungs and gastrointestinal tract. The incubation period for the disease-the time
between the initial infection of the virus and the onset of AIDS-is more than nine years.
AIDS is fatal, on average, two years after diagnosis.
There are many fewer persons with AIDS than there are asymptomatic carriers and
persons with ARC. Ironically, people who are afraid of AIDS fear acquiring the disease
from a person with AIDS, even though asymptomatic carriers or those with ARC can as
easily infect others. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SURGEON GENERAL'S RE-
PORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (1986).
14. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 339 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1986).
15. Verla S. Neslund et al., The Role of CDC in the Development of AIDS Recommendations
and Guidelines, AMAJ. LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE, Summer 1987, at 76; WEINER, supra note
3, at 29.
16. Acting on the recommendation of their AIDS medical teams, some schools have
placed AIDS children who have a history of biting in home instruction. Yet research data
and medical opinion support this approach only in the cases of HIV-infected children who
are physically assaultive or incontinent or have weeping (wet) skin lesions. WEINER, supra
note 3, at 29.
17. If a biting does occur, the virus can be destroyed by carefully washing the wound
1992]
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or in school.' 8
Although biting is not considered dangerous by the medical profes-
sion, school boards take such occurrences seriously. A child with AIDS
who bites an uninfected child may cause hysteria among parents and
stigma for the families involved. This parental concern is real in the
sense that HIV is found in saliva. ' 9 Thus, an AIDS-infected child's his-
tory of biting is a valid criterion for denying that child admission to
school.
B. The AIDS Crisis and Students' Civil Rights
School officials should be sensitive to the fear and social stigma that
children or school personnel with AIDS may experience if information
about their condition is released, or if false information is transmitted.
20
They should also be mindful of other rights of persons with AIDS and of
the concerns of children and employees about contracting AIDS in the
school environment, and they need to make realistic plans for managing
the school in light of the disease.
Recent United States Supreme Court decisions have restricted
some of the rights of school children, compared with those of adults,
possibly because the Court believes that educators need authority to
control and regulate increasingly aggressive, crime-prone youth. In New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 2 1 the Court reduced the adult standard of probable
cause to "reasonable suspicion" in a Fourth Amendment challenge of a
student search. In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,2 2 the Court al-
lowed a school to regulate sexually explicit language through its "dis-
ruptive conduct rule." Bethel clearly gave school officials much greater
discretion in controlling student expression than government agencies
ordinarily would be allowed in controlling adult expression. Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier23 upheld a high school principal's decision to
prevent publication of portions of the school newspaper. A reasonable-
ness standard, not strict scrutiny, was applied to this curtailment of mi-
nors' freedom of speech in a school setting. Evidently the landmark
1969 Tinker decision, 24 which extended students' rights, has been seri-
ously eroded, challenged, and some would argue, eviscerated as a result
of these recent Court rulings.
with soap and water, followed by a disinfectant such as alcohol. WEINER, supra note 3, at
189.
18. AIDS AND THE LAW, supra note 10, at 35.
19. WEINER, supra note 3, at 19.
20. Falsely accusing someone of having a "loathesome disease" such as AIDS consiti-
tutes defamation in most states. A school employee or a prospective employee could sue
for defamation if he or she were wrongly accused of having AIDS or referred to in deroga-
tory comments about lifestyle or job performance.
21. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
22. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
23. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
24. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding
that school officials' ban against students wearing black armbands was an unreasonable
regulation of the students' form of expression).
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1. The Right to Privacy
When a student (or another person) with AIDS is publicly identi-
fied, his or her constitutional right to privacy 2 5 may be violated. In
some states, students generally are protected by a statute providing that
school officials may not release or permit access to personally identify-
ing information (other than directory information) concerning any pupil
attending a public school, without the written consent of a parent,
guardian or custodian, or the written consent of a pupil who is over
eighteen years old.
26
Student records receive additional federal protection. The Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)2 7 is much more detailed
than most of the state rights and privacy acts that track FERPA. This
federal law, known as the Buckley Amendment, provides students over
eighteen years of age and their parents the right to inspect and review
educational records, 28 to challenge information 29 and to prohibit the
disclosure of selected records.
30
State privacy protections such as the Ohio Public Records Act 3' and
the Ohio Privacy Act 3 2 usually do not extend to the administrative use of
public school records by authorized school employees, a court or the
federal government.3 3 This creates a problem when a student's records
are transferred to another school. To forward student records in the
standard manner may violate the student's constitutional right of privacy
by making it possible for his condition to become public knowledge
without his consent.3 4 Therefore, the records of a student with AIDS
should be transmitted under special cover directly to an official in the
receiving school who has a "need to know." Otherwise, no one should
be privy to the information.
In Doe v. Borough of Barrington,3 5 a federal district court held that
disclosure of an AIDS victim's condition to people with whom the victim
had not even had casual contact violated that person's Fourteenth
Amendment right to privacy. An earlier Fourth Circuit opinion ac-
knowledged the right to privacy but held that the student plaintiff's pri-
vacy was not invaded by a school board policy of AIDS disclosure in
25. See Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536, 539 (N.Y. 1987) (listing court decisions that
have found a constitutional right to privacy regarding decisions relating to marriage, pro-
creation, contraception and personal contact).
26. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.321 (Anderson Supp. 1991). Interestingly, Ohio
law provides less protection for school employees' records than for students' records,
since the public's "right to know" allows anyone to see the public record of a school em-
ployee, with some exceptions.
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1984).
28. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (a)(l)(A) (1984).
29. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (a)(2) (1984).
30. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g(b)(l)-(2) (1984).
31. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(B) (Anderson 1990).
32. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01-1347.09 (Anderson Supp. 1991).
33. Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.321(C) (Anderson Supp. 1991).
34. WEINER, supra note 3, at 92.
35. 729 F. Supp. 376 (D.N.J. 1990).
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untraceable and general terms.3 6
2. The Right to Education
Schools must also deal with the right of students with AIDS to at-
tend school. Courts rarely disturb the judgment of a school board in the
exercise of its duties as long as it acted in good faith and its decision was
not arbitrary, unreasonable or in clear violation of the law. 3 7 A court
might intervene, however, when a school tries to exclude pupils with
AIDS or ARC. Injunctive relief has been granted liberally to children
with AIDS who wish to attend regular school classes, 38 and courts have
overturned school board attempts to exclude students with AIDS from
the classroom. In California, for example, parents of an infected child
brought an action against school officials who denied the child attend-
ance in regular kindergarten classes. 39 The court held that in the ab-
sence of evidence that he posed a significant risk of harm to his
kindergarten classmates or teachers, the child could attend regular
classes. In Florida, parents of three hemophiliac, asymptomatic school
children sought a preliminary injunction against the school's segrega-
tion of the children from a regular classroom setting, alleging violations
of the federal Rehabilitation Act, Florida statutes and the Florida and
United States Constitutions.40 The court granted the injunction, unless
and until it could be established that the children posed a real and valid
threat to the school population. In Illinois, a student with AIDS was
excluded from classes and given a home tutor. Alleging discrimination,
the student brought suit against the school district and board of educa-
tion. The court held that the student was not required to exhaust ad-




Children with AIDS may seek admission to a classroom setting
under the Equal Protection Clause,42 which prohibits state governments
from treating similarly situated persons differently. Children with AIDS
or ARC and children who have had no exposure to the virus may be
considered similarly situated because neither group can transmit the dis-
36. Child v. Spillane, 875 F.2d 314 (Table) (4th Cir. 1989) (text in WESTLAW).
37. See, e.g., Brannon v. Board of Educ., 124 N.E. 235 (Ohio 1919). See also 68 AM.
JUR. 2D Schools § 52 (1973).
38. See, e.g., Doe v. Dolton Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 148, 694 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill.
1988); Phipps v. Saddleback Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 Cal. Rptr. 720 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988); Robertson v. Granite City Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 9, 684 F. Supp. 1002
(S.D. Ill. 1988).
39. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987). See
also Board of Educ. v. Cooperman, 523 A.2d 655 (N.J. 1987) (court upheld state commis-
sioner's decision to overrule local school boards' exclusion of students with AIDS).
40. Ray v. School Dist. of Desoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987). One
child was given homebound instruction; the others were segregated from their classmates
at school.
41. Doe v. Belleville Public Sch. Dist. No. 118, 672 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. Iil. 1987).
42. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
320 [Vol. 69:3
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ease in a normal, unrestricted school setting. Whether, in a particular
case, segregating children with AIDS violates their right to equal protec-
tion will be decided according to the standard the court applies-strict
scrutiny or rational basis.
Strict scrutiny is the highest level of review employed when equal
protection is at issue. It requires a close relation between the state inter-
est and the means chosen to achieve it. The state could attempt to jus-
tify barring children with AIDS from regular classrooms by claiming a
compelling government interest in preventing the spread of AIDS.
Since the overwhelming weight of medical authority indicates that AIDS
cannot be spread by causal contact, however, the state's action would
not survive the strict scrutiny test. 4 3 In any event, the Court has applied
strict scrutiny only when a fundamental right is affected. Education is
not explicitly protected by the United States Constitution and, there-
fore, does not merit protection as a fundamental right.
44
When a classification does not merit strict scrutiny, the courts apply
the rational basis test. The test is whether a reasonable basis exists for
treating children with AIDS differently from noninfected children in the
context of regular classroom attendance. 45 Courts usually defer to a
state assertion of power to protect the public health. 46 Medical opinion
cannot guarantee that AIDS will not be transmitted in a classroom set-
ting. A state may be justified, therefore, under the rational basis test, in
barring or segregating children with AIDS from regular classroom at-
tendance, even though such action might be deemed "unwise" or have
an "unequal result."
Thus, courts probably will apply a rational basis test, not strict scru-
tiny, to the issue of whether children with AIDS should be allowed in the
classroom. Further, courts using the traditional rational basis test are
likely to support any state practice intended to protect the public health.
Interestingly, a New York court used a rational basis test to uphold an
anti-discriminatory school board policy. 4 7 The plaintiffs were not ag-
43. Alternatively, the state might argue that fear of AIDS and its disruptive conse-
quences are an adequate reason for dissimilar treatment of a similarly situated class. As
yet, however, the Supreme Court has not endorsed the view that popular opinion should
override the Equal Protection Clause. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
44. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Street v. Cobb County Sch. Dist., 520 F. Supp. 1170 (N.D. Ga.
1981).
45. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954) can be interpreted to sug-
gest that school children with AIDS should be protected from discrimination by height-
ened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. In Brown, the Supreme Court
recognized "intangible" factors in segregating students, including stigmatization and feel-
ings of inferiority. These intangible factors also apply to children with AIDS who are seg-
regated from the regular classroom. For an extended discussion, see Susan A. Winchell,
Discrimination in the Public Schools: Dick and Jane Have AIDS, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 881
(1988).
46. E.g., Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 170 n.44 (Alaska 1972) (schools may exclude
students with contagious diseases from class).
47. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1986).
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grieved students, but two local community school boards. Based on a
New York City Board of Education policy that forbade the automatic
exclusion of students with AIDS from the city schools, 4 8 a seven-year-
old student with AIDS was permitted to remain in school. The local
community boards sought injunctive relief to prevent the student's at-
tendance and to require disclosure of the student's name and school.
The court found that an automatic exclusion was not required because
AIDS is not a communicable disease under city or state health statutes;
4 9
that using the required case-by-case determination of the placement of
students with AIDS did not violate state or federal laws relating to hand-
icapped children; 50 and that the requested disclosure of the name of the
child with AIDS would violate city and state health laws.
5 1
Under traditional equal protection analysis, a court should deter-
mine whether a rational basis exists for refusing to admit any category of
AIDS patient to school. Because medical experts agree that AIDS "is
not transmitted by casual interpersonal contact or airborne spread,"
52
there is no rational basis to support a decision to exclude a typical stu-
dent with AIDS.
4. Other Theories that Favor Keeping AIDS-Infected Children
in School
Other theories appear viable for the purpose of protecting students
with AIDS, though they have not yet been developed in any reported
cases. The Due Process Clause 5 3 requires that proper notice and hear-
ing be given before a person is deprived of a property right such as
school attendance, or the liberty rights of privacy and reputation. Be-
cause of the emotion involved in AIDS situations, victims' procedural
due process rights may be ignored. Further, given the unanimity of
medical testimony, a decision to remove or segregate a student with
AIDS is arbitrary, capricious and a violation of the student's substantive
due process rights.
Using the federal guidelines issued in 1985 by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control, 54 many school districts have adopted a case-by-case ap-
48. Id. at 328. No change in placement could occur except when recommended by a
committee that had reviewed the case to determine whether the child posed a threat to
others.
49. Id. at 333. In 1979, the Second Circuit prevented the New York City School
Board from segregating 50 children with hepatitis B, which is far more communicable than
AIDS. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir.
1979).
50. District 27 Community Sch. Bd., 502 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
51. Id. at 340-41.
52. Id. at 330. See also Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.
1988); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987); and
Ray v. School Dist. of DeSoto County, 666 F. Supp. 1524 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V, applied to the states by amend. XIV, § 1.
54. In August 1985, the Centers for Disease Control published two sets of guidelines
for schools-one for employees, based on the Centers' general guidelines for the trans-
mission of AIDS in the workplace, and one for students. The guidelines advise schools to
keep students with the virus in the classroom. For most school-age children with AIDS,
the benefits of attending school outweigh the risk of catching infections from other stu-
[Vol. 69:3
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proach. The guidelines suggest that schools exclude only children
whose behavior might expose uninfected children to the virus. They
also suggest that a team composed of the child's doctor, a public health
official, the child's parent or guardian and a representative of the school
make that determination.
Unless intervention is warranted, 5 5 schools officials can ease the
psychological pain suffered by a student with AIDS by allowing him or
her to remain at school, free of the stigma associated with the disease.
5 6
Many terminal cancer patients live much longer than expected when
they are given support to pursue as many of their normal activities as
they can. By analogy, the same would be true for AIDS-infected chil-
dren. Engaging in their normal activities enhances not only the quality
of their lives but also their will to live.
C. Federal Protection for Handicapped Children
The Rehabilitation Act 5 7 was enacted in 1973 to protect handi-
capped people. Section 504 has been used successfully in AIDS cases. 58
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-
142), 59 like the Rehabilitation Act, was intended to discourage institu-
tions from discriminating against the handicapped. While both § 504
and P.L. 94-142 protect individuals with physical, emotional or intellec-
tual handicaps, § 504 goes beyond these handicaps to include individu-
als addicted to alcohol or drugs. Additionally, while P.L. 94-142 has
jurisdiction over handicapped students ages three to twenty-one, § 504
extends their civil rights protection to the adult work environment. To
qualify as handicapped under P.L. 94-142, students initially must com-
plete a formal evaluation establishing them as students with specific con-
ditions. In contrast, § 504 does not require anyone to be formally
evaluated before being designated as handicapped; being perceived as
having a handicap is sufficient.
dents, and the benefits certainly outweigh "the apparent nonexistent risk" of other stu-
dents contracting AIDS from them. A more restricted environment is recommended for
pre-school age children, neurologically handicapped children and those who lack control
of their body secretions, who bite others or who have open lesions. For a more complete
discussion see PERSPECTIVE ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 38-40. The two sets of guidelines
are reproduced in WEINER, supra note 3, at 127-50.
55. In Ohio, a rarely-used provision grants emergency power to a city health district.
In cases of emergency caused by epidemics of contagious or infectious diseases, or condi-
tions or events endangering the public health, a city board of health may issue orders and
regulations, effective immediately, necessary for the public health or the prevention or
restriction of disease. OnIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3709.20 (Anderson 1992).
56. WEINER, supra note 3, at 126.
57. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1988).
58. The Ninth Circuit strongly supported the use of § 504 in Chalk v. United States
Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). The court declared that Victor Chalk, a teacher
who had "full-blown" AIDS, was handicapped but otherwise qualified to teach. Chalk was
permitted to return to his classroom.
59. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1988).
1992]
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1. The Rehabilitation Act
Section 504 provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with
handicaps in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his
handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity re-
ceiving Federal financial assistance ...... 60 The Act defines a handi-
capped person as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's ma-
jor life activities, and (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is
regarded as having such an impairment." 6 1 An "otherwise qualified"
person is "able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of this
handicap."
62
Section 504 requires an employer-or an educational agency-to
make any "reasonable accommodation" necessary that allows the per-
son to perform the assigned tasks, thereby making the person "other-
wise qualified" under the Act.63 The Supreme Court has defined
"reasonable accommodation" as not imposing undue financial and ad-
ministrative burdens, or not requiring "a fundamental alteration in the
nature of [the] program. ' ' 4
What must a school district do, under § 504, to provide a free, equi-
table and nondiscriminatory education for students with AIDS? In Ray
v. School District of DeSoto County, a federal district court ordered a school
district to enroll three brothers-hemophiliacs who carried the AIDS vi-
rus-in a regular classroom setting "[u]nless and until it can be estab-
lished that these boys pose a real and valid threat to the school
population of DeSoto County."'6 5 Although it did not address family
homebound instruction directly, the court determined that this alterna-
tive would violate § 504 because the brothers were otherwise qualified
for regular classroom placement.
6 6
In Martinez v. School Board of Hillsbrough County, Florida, however, the
same court decided that a six-year-old mentally retarded student with
AIDS-related complex (ARC) should be placed in a homebound pro-
gram rather than in a regular classroom. 6 7 Along with her other disabil-
ities, she was incontinent, drooled continually and sucked her thumb or
60. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1988).
61. Id. § 706(8)(B). A "physical impairment" is "any physiological disorder or condi-
tion, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, including
speech organs; cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lym-
phatic; skin; and endocrine." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1991). "Major life activities" are
"functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1991).
62. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979).
63. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(1) (1991).
64. Davis, 442 U.S. at 410.
65. 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1535 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
66. See also Doe v. Belleville Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 118, 672 F. Supp. 342 (S.D. I1. 1987)
(a student with AIDS was otherwise qualified to attend school in a regular classroom set-
ting rather than with the home tutor that the school district offered).
67. 675 F. Supp. 1574 (M.D. Fla. 1987).
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finger. 68 The court held that it must weigh the public interest in pro-
tecting health against the child's interest in an education:
[T]he specific potential harm to others clearly outweighs the
interests of plaintiff, and . . . the public interest in this case
weighs in favor of not returning Eliana Martinez to a classroom
setting. Where, as here, there is any question as to whether the public
safety and welfare is threatened, the Court must rule on the side of that
public interest.
69
Whether a child infected with AIDS was otherwise qualified to at-
tend a regular kindergarten class, within the meaning of § 504, was at
issue in a recent California case. 70 Ryan Thomas, who had AIDS, at-
tended a regular kindergarten class without incident for three days. On
the fourth day he bit another child on the leg. Although the other
child's skin was not broken, Ryan was removed from the classroom and
was required to undergo a psychological evaluation. 7 1 The court con-
cluded that Ryan was handicapped within the meaning of § 504 but was
otherwise qualified to attend the regular kindergarten class. 7 2 The rul-
ing was based on a psychologist's finding that though Ryan might be
prone to aggressive behavior because of his undeveloped language and
social skills, there was no indication that he would bite another student
again. 7 3 Weighing Ryan's rights and needs against the safety of the
other students, the court concluded that Ryan's rights should prevail.
74
When local school boards challenged the New York City Board of
Education's policy against automatic exclusion of children with AIDS, a
state court upheld the policy, basing its decision, in part, on § 504.
7 5
The court agreed with the New York City Board that no rational basis
existed for automatically excluding all students with AIDS and that each
student was entitled to a review to determine whether he or she was
otherwise qualified to attend school in a regular setting.
76
Section 504 was used successfully to force a federally financed voca-
tional instruction center to admit a known Hepatitis B carrier. 77 The
plaintiff, Kohl, a blind, mentally retarded adult, exhibited behavior
problems, including scratching and biting. He claimed that he met the
§ 504 criteria for handicap and that he was otherwise qualified for ad-
mission to the program. The court agreed, finding that Kohl, was enti-
tled to admission to the vocational program despite his behavior
problems. Further, the accommodation required for his enrollment was
68. Id. at 1576.
69. Id. at 1582.
70. Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
71. Id. at 380.
72. Id. at 381.
73. Id. at 380-81. ,
74. Id. at 381-82.
75. District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Educ., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 336 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1986).
76. Id. at 335.
77. Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 672 F. Supp. 1221 (W.D. Mo. 1987) cert. denied,
493 U.S. 892 (1989).
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reasonable in view of the defendant school's four million-dollar budget
and the minimal cost of inoculating the affected employees. 7s The
court's reasoning in Kohl, if applied, would protect persons with AIDS in
public schools, since public schools are instrumentalities of the state.
2. The Education for All Handicapped Children Act
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-
142)79 was enacted to ensure that handicapped individuals between the
ages of three and twenty-one would receive a free and appropriate pub-
lic education.8 0 Public Law 94-142 defines special education as "spe-
cially designed instruction at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet
the unique needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruc-
tion, instruction in physical education, home instruction, and instruction
in hospitals and institutions.- 8 1 The Act requires that each student be
provided an individual education program 82 that specifies the least re-
strictive environment in which his or her education can effectively take
place.8 3 Mainstreaming, where the student is placed in a regular pro-
gram for as much time as possible, is strongly encouraged.
84
Case law has established that if P.L. 94-142 is to apply in an AIDS
case, the child must display "limited strength, vitality, or alertness,
which adversely affects [his] educatonal performance. ' 85 A handi-
capped child who has AIDS cannot be refused admission to the least
restrictive environment for the handicapping condition.8 6 The Act enti-
tles all handicapped children to a public education, regardless of the
severity of their handicapping condition.
8 7
A mentally handicapped child with Down's syndrome who was also
a Hepatitis B carrier successfully relied on P.L. 94-142 in Community High
School District v. Denz.88 The court upheld an independent hearing of-
78. Id. at 1232-33. The cost for inoculation was projected at $10,000 to $12,000 ini-
tially plus $4,500 for each future year based on expected employee turnover.
79. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1988).
80. The purpose of the Act was to assure that all handicapped children have access to
a free appropriate public education "which emphasizes special education and related serv-
ices designed to meet their needs;" to protect the rights of handicapped children and their
parents and to assist states and localities in providing for the education of handicapped
children. Id. § 1400(c).
81. Id. § 1401(16) (1988).
82. Id. § 1401(19) (1988).
83. Id. § 1412(5)(1988).
84. Id. (states required to establish procedures to assure that, "to the maximum ex-
tent appropriate, handicapped children .. . are educated with children who are not
handicapped").
85. Doe v. Belleville Public Sch. Dist. No. 118, 672 F. Supp. 342, 344 (S.D. Ill. 1987).
86. Parents of Child, Code No. 870901W v. Coker, 676 F. Supp. 1072, 1074 (E.D.
Okla. 1987). The child had been diagnosed with emotional problems and had also tested
positive for the HIV virus. The court held that the student was handicapped under the
definitions of P.L. 94-142, that the emotional disability classroom was the least restrictive
environment and that the student could not be refused admission to the school system's
class for emotionally disturbed students.
87. Timothy W. v. Rochester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 983 (1989).
88. 463 N.E.2d 998 (1984).
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ficer's order requiring mainstreaming in a special education center,
which was the least restrictive environment for the child's educational
needs. The court held that in view of the child's behavioral history and
the individualized instruction program at the center, the risk of transmit-
ting hepatitis did not outweigh the injury to the student if she remained
isolated from her peers.
89
A plaintiff who brings an action under P.L. 94-142 usually is re-
quired to exhaust all administrative remedies prior to a judicial hearing.
Courts have begun to recognize, however, that for AIDS victims, the
procedural sequence specified in P.L. 94-142 must perforce be circum-
vented.90 Time is the most valuable commodity of children with AIDS,
and society must ensure that time is used to make their lives as normal
and comfortable as possible.
II. TEACHERS AND OTHER EMPLOYEES
A. The Right to Privacy
Like students, teachers9 ' and other school employees who may have
AIDS or who are concerned about infection have a right to privacy.
Their personnel records are protected by state statutes. 92 School em-
ployees' personnel records are provided additional protections in many
states by collective bargaining agreements between boards of education
and teachers' unions. Nevertheless, much of the information in a
teacher's personnel file is available to the public on request in states
where state law considers a public employee's personnel file a "public
record."'9 3 In these states the general public's right to know usually
prevails over a school employee's right of privacy.
94
Although untested, it seems clear that in Ohio, at least, a school
employee with AIDS could protect his or her records based on a three-
part balancing test analysis used in non-AIDS cases to resolve potential
conflicts between the privacy act and the public records statute. The test
requires the court to consider whether disclosure of the information
would result in an invasion of privacy and, if so, how serious the invasion
would be; whether the public would be served by disclosure and whether
the information is available from other sources. 95 Doubt as to whether
disclosure is proper is resolved in favor of disclosure of "public
89. Id. at 1004.
90. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
91. In Ohio, the term "teacher" includes all persons certified to teach who are em-
ployed as instructors, principals, supervisors or superintendents, or in any other position
requiring certification. OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.09(A) (Anderson 1990).
92. For example, in Ohio such protection is found in the Ohio Privacy Act, OHIO REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 1347.01-1347.09 (Anderson Supp. 1991).
93. In Ohio, virtually every record kept by a public entity, including school districts,
county divisions, state offices and administrative agencies, is a public record. OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1) (Anderson 1990).
94. In Ohio, the statute unequivocally gives preference to public access. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1347.08(E)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1991).
95. Wooster Republican Printing Co. v. City of Wooster, 383 N.E.2d 124, 129 (Ohio
1978).
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records." '9 6 Although the Ohio Supreme Court subsequently reduced
the weight of an "invasion of privacy" in the balancing test,9 7 the gener-
ally heightened concern for the privacy of persons with AIDS should, on
balance, prevail.
Medical records are specifically excluded from the operation of the
Ohio public records law,9 8 but it is unclear whether it is the medical
record in the doctor's office or the medical record in the personnel file
that is exempt from disclosure. If it is the medical record given to the
employer by the AIDS patient's doctor, then that record would not have
to be released by a public agency under existing Ohio law. It is also
unclear what a school district should do when one of its employees tests
positive for AIDS. Should the information be placed in his or her file?
Should it be communicated? To whom?
The conditions under which a person with AIDS would prevail in a
tort action based on a privacy violation have not been specifically deter-
mined,9 9 though several cases have addressed students' privacy con-
cerns. 100 Unless it has a malicious intent, a statement is not actionable
when made within the context of a qualified or conditional privilege,
that is, where a commonality of interest exists between the publisher and
the recipient, and the communication is a kind reasonably calculated to
protect or further that interest.' 0 ' Frequently, in such cases, "there is a
legal, as well as a moral, obligation to speak."' 0 2 An actionable invasion
of the right of privacy is the
"unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personalty,
the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the public has
no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into one's private
activities in such a manner as to outrage or cause mental suffer-
ing, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary
96. Id. at 129-30.
97. State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Wells, 481 N.E.2d 632, 635 (Ohio 1985) (the
public's right of access to a public employee's personnel file may not in any way be re-
stricted by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement or be otherwise withheld from
the public or the news media).
98. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43(A)(1) (Anderson 1990).
99. One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). Comment d states that
"[wihen the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there
is no invasion of privacy."
100. See supra notes 34-36.
101. The essential elements of a conditionally privileged communication are good
faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper
occasion and proper publication to proper parties only. West v. People's Banking & Trust
Co., 236 N.E.2d 679, 681 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967).
102. Creps v. Waltz, 450 N.E.2d 716, 718 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (quoting Hahn v. Kot-
ten, 331 N.E.2d 713, 718 (Ohio 1975)). In Hahn, the trial court was required to grant a
directed verdict for defendants if the statements at issue met the conditionally privileged
communication definition and if the record contained no evidence of actual malice on




The Ohio Court of Appeals has held that a medical examiner may
not disclose information about a patient to anyone without first seeking
the patient's permission.' 0 4 Only certain aspects of the doctor/patient
relationship are protected, however. For example, a secretary working
at a medical center wrongfully divulged confidential information about a
patient during her lunch hour, but the center was held not liable. The
court held that corporations are liable for injuries caused by the wrong-




Are teachers and other employees with AIDS afforded the same
protection against discrimination that students with AIDS enjoy? In
1988, the Ninth Circuit did extend protection to teachers, holding that a
school system may not discriminate against a teacher infected with
AIDS. 1
0 6
Chalk, a teacher of hearing-impaired students, was hospitalized with
pneumonia and diagnosed as having AIDS. After several months of
treatment and recuperation, he was declared able to return to work, but
his Orange County, California school district put him on administrative
leave for the remainder of that year and then offered him an administra-
tive job with the same salary and benefits that he would have received
teaching. Chalk rejected this offer, preferring to return to the class-
room. A federal district court refused to issue an injunction requiring
that Chalk be allowed to teach. The Ninth Circuit unanimously re-
versed, relying on School Board of Nassau County v. Arline. 10 7 The court
concluded that Chalk was "otherwise qualified" to teach under § 504
despite having AIDS and a history of previous physical impairment from
AIDS. The "otherwise qualified" determination depended on whether a
reasonable accommodation would eliminate any risk that Chalk would
communicate an infectious disease to others in the workplace. The
103. Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 499 N.E.2d 1291, 1294 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)
(quoting Housh v. Peth, 133 N.E.2d 340 (Ohio 1956) (emphasis added)).
104. Levias v. United Airlines, 500 N.E.2d 370, 374-75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985) ("The
discloser has no privilege unless he has reason to believe that the recipient has a real need
to know, not mere curiosity.").
105. Knecht v. Vandalia Medical Ctr., Inc., 470 N.E.2d 230, 233 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
106. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988). In fact, a school
may face a wrongful discharge claim if it terminates an employee with AIDS merely be-
cause he or she is perceived to be a threat to co-workers. The 1985 Centers for Disease
Control guidelines regarding the transmission of AIDS in the workplace state that an in-
fected employee should not be restricted from working solely because he or she has AIDS.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, GUIDELINES FOR EMPLOYEES, cited in WEINER, supra note
2, at 148.
107. 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (establishing that § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act applies to
public employees who are infected with a contagious disease, in Arline's case tuberculosis,
and who have a history of previous physical impairment from the disease, even if they do
not currently suffer from the impairment).
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court reviewed the four Arline factors 10 8 before deciding that Chalk's re-
turn to the classroom would not pose a significant risk that he would com-
municate an infectious disease to his students.10 9 Even though the
potential harm resulting from AIDS is catastrophic and the duration of
the risk of infection is indefinite (two of the Arline factors) the court
found "an overwhelming evidentiary consensus of medical and scientific
opinion regarding the nature and transmission of AIDS.""I 0
While the Ninth Circuit ruling was not unexpected after Arline, it
does mean that a school district should consider its decision carefully
before arbitrarily reassigning a teacher with AIDS. By the same token,
however, it must continue to monitor the condition of a teacher with
AIDS who is allowed to remain in the classroom. For example, it was
highly probable that Chalk's immune system would deteriorate over
time, making him very susceptible to opportunistic infections. While
these infections do not cause AIDS, they are contagious in a classroom
setting. Eventually, if Chalk did not voluntarily leave the classroom, his
school board would have to exercise its power to control, regulate and
protect.
Many states have enacted strict handicap provisions that would pro-
tect teachers. For example, the Ohio Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimi-
nation against the handicapped and is even more pervasive and
protective than the federal statutes.' Its provisions are enforced by
the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC). 112 In cooperation with the
Department of Education, OCRC must prepare a comprehensive educa-
tion program for the public schools "to eliminate prejudice on the basis
of... handicap."' '3 State entities like OCRC can accept and investigate
charges alleging discrimination on the basis of AIDS. Such charges
would be analyzed under the commonly-accepted legal standards ap-
plied to other handicaps.
Finally, teachers do not have an option to leave when a person with
AIDS enters the school,' '4 but they may legitimately expect the school
108. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
109. Since Chalk had physical symptoms and a previous physical impairment from
AIDS, he was not asymptomatic, but fully met the Arline conditions. 480 U.S. at 288. The
Ninth Circuit, therefore, did not address the critical question of protection for a staff mem-
ber who is asymptomatic.
110. 840 F.2d at 706. Essentially, this is a finding that there is no known risk of trans-
mitting AIDS through the nonsexual, noninvasive, day-to-day interaction between teach-
ers and students in the classroom.
11. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4112 (Anderson 1991).
112. Id. § 4112.04.
113. Id. § 4112.04(A)(9).
114. A difficult question is whether employees who object to working with an AIDS
victim-or someone whom they fear will expose them to the disease-are protected
against employer discipline for engaging in concerted activity, which is allowed under the
National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1988)). In an AIDS situation, such
activity could conceivably consist of teachers refusing to work because a coworker who had
AIDS was allowed to continue working in the school. This is a hypothetical situation; the
author knows of no such present case. The author believes, however, that such an action
would not be protected under the "concerted action" provisions of the NLRA. See 29
U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
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district to provide adequate training to ensure that they understand
AIDS and know how to act to avoid unreasonable danger. Their fears
will diminish if they are taught to use the so-called "universal
precautions." 115
C. The 1973 Rehabilitation Act
Numerous state statutes prohibit employment discrimination
against the handicapped; some of these extend protection to persons
with AIDS. 1 6 Many of these statutes protect both public and private
employees. The federal government also has adopted laws intended to
integrate the handicapped into the social mainstream.' 1 7 To determine
coverage for the handicapped, therefore, persons with AIDS and schools
should examine both sets of laws.
The model statute on disability discrimination is the federal Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973.118 It is the vehicle most often used to redress
claims of handicap discrimination in employment.' ' 9 It applies to fed-
eral employees and contractors and to all programs receiving federal
financial assistance. Its fundamental principle 120 is that an "otherwise
qualified handicapped individual" may not be denied an opportunity to
participate in any federally funded program or activity. 12 1 Under the
federal definition, not only AIDS carriers but those who are victimized
because they are thought to have AIDS or who seem likely to get AIDS
could be protected.122 Although no specific case law protects people in
115. "Universal precautions" consist of treating every situation as if it were one in
which a person could, without proper precautions, become infected by someone with the
HIV virus. In the school setting, this would mean, for example, that a teacher wears rub-
ber gloves when helping any child who has suffered an injury that could cause an AIDS
infection. This protects the teacher regardless of whether the child is infected.
Doctors disagree as to the risk that the virus will be transmitted through contact with
blood during a fight or an injury that may occur at school. Studies have shown that to
infect another person would require a large amount of blood, containing a large quantity
of the virus particles, entering the other person's bloodstream. Furthermore, with the
type of injuries that occur on a school ground, the body immediately begins to heal the
open wound through the clotting process. This process, it has been argued, creates a
natural barrier that prevents commingling of the two individuals' blood and thus forms a
natural barrier to the virus. WEINER, supra note 3, at 190.
116. Arthur S. Leonard, Employment Discrimination Against Persons With AIDS, 10 U. DAY-
TON L. REV. 681, 689-96 (1985).
117. See, e.g., id. at 689-90 n.35; see also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-
796 (1991).
118. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1991).
119. Although much debate surrounds whether § 504 applies to AIDS, Congress could
not possibly have intended the Rehabilitation Act to cover AIDS because AIDS was not yet
diagnosed in 1973 when the Act was passed. In Arline, the Supreme Court reviewed the
scope of § 504 and specifically refrained from commenting on its applicability to AIDS.
This was a purposeful decision on the Court's part, based on "ripeness." In a 1986 mem-
orandum, however, the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice ruled that
AIDS and disabling symptoms of ARC were "handicaps" under § 504. Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 122, at D-I (June 25, 1986).
120. As enunciated in § 504.
121. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (1991).
122. People who are infected by the virus but have not experienced debilitating symp-
toms appear to be covered by the final section of the Rehabilitation Act's definition, which
refers to people who "are regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
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the latter two categories, § 504 probably will be extended to them, be-
cause the Act unambiguously refers to physical impairments that sub-
stantially limit life activities.
12 3
In Arline, the school board argued that discrimination against a
handicapped person could be lawful if it is based on fears deriving from
the handicap's contagious nature.' 24 The Supreme Court rejected that
argument and held instead that a school teacher afflicted with the conta-
gious disease of tuberculosis is a "handicapped individual" within the
meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. This means that a federally-funded
state program may not discriminate against a person with tuberculosis
solely because of the tuberculosis. As to whether an employer may dis-
charge an individual who suffering from a contagious disease because of
"fear of contagion," when the disease is defined as a handicap, the
Court concluded that while school districts can protect an individual
with AIDS from the irrational fears of others, only medical professionals
can separate irrational fear from just cause. The school argued, unsuc-
cessfully, that Arline had been discharged not because of her diminished
physical capacity but because her tuberculosis posed a threat to the
health of others. The Court ruled that the Rehabilitation Act does not
consider conditions that could "impair the health of others" a
handicap. 1
25
The Arline Court did not determine whether the Rehabilitation Act
protects a person with the HIV antibody. Instead, the Court adopted a
four-part test recommended by the American Medical Association in its
amicus brief. In remanding the case to the district court to determine
whether Arline was "otherwise qualified," the Court required that the
trial court base its decision on:
[findings of] facts, based on reasonable medical judgments
given the state of medical knowledge, about (a) the nature of
the risk (how the disease is transmitted), (b) the duration of the
risk (how long is the carrier infectious), (c) the severity of the
risk (what is the potential harm to third parties) and (d) the
probabilities the disease will be transmitted and will cause vary-
ing degrees of harm. 1
2 6
The Arline decision protects individuals against irrational fear or
prejudice on the part of employees or fellow workers, but it does not
require an employer to hire someone who has a contagious disease. The
Court said only that individuals who are both handicapped and other-
wise qualified are eligible for relief under § 504. Later, in Chalk, the
Ninth Circuit held that a teacher with AIDS was handicapped and other-
wise qualified for employment under § 504.127
In fact, members of high risk groups who are not infected (or not known to be infected),
but who are treated adversely in employment because they are perceived as threatening to
infect others with AIDS, could be protected by the "regarded as" category.
123. See, e.g., PERSPECTIVES ON AIDS, supra note 1, at 22-31.
124. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282.
125. Id. at 284-85.
126. Id. at 288.
127. 840 F.2d at 711.
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Arline provided the commonly-used rationale for expressly rejecting
the application of a standard of law based on the communicability of
AIDS as opposed to the impairment itself. This is the legal crux of the
AIDS issue, because a person with AIDS may not be impaired at all. If, in the
specific case, medical opinion indicates that there is no likelihood or
probability of communicating the disease through casual social contact,
a person with AIDS probably will not be treated as handicapped. Thus,
an asymptomatic carrier would not be treated as handicapped because
of the low probability of communicating the disease through casual con-
tact. As the danger of contagion increases, however, as for example with
AIDS-Related Complex and certainly with full-blown AIDS, handi-
capped status will likely attach.
D. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) is effective on July
26, 1992. The Act makes it unlawful for private employers, state and
local governments, employment agencies and labor unions to discrimi-
nate against qualified individuals with disabilities in the job application
process or in hiring, firing, promotion, training, compensation or other
terms and conditions of employment.
128
Coverage under the ADA is parallel to that under the 1973 Rehabil-
itation Act with regard to definitions of disability and qualified individu-
als. Both statutes allow the option of being "regarded as having such an
impairment." Although AIDS is not mentioned in the statute, it is clear
from the legislative history that Congress intended the Act to protect
persons with AIDS and those with HIV from discriminatory acts.
129
III. PREVENTING THE SPREAD OF AIDS
Like everyone else, school employees and pupils have a duty to pre-
vent the spread of a contagious disease. Many states have laws requiring
that a person who knows or has reasonable cause to believe that he is
suffering from a dangerous and contagious disease must take reasonable
measures to prevent exposing others to the disease.' 30 Thus, in states
that have enacted this type of law, a person with AIDS who knowingly
fails to take such reasonable measures could be found guilty of a crimi-
nal offense and could be subject to selective isolation. Many believe that
a person with AIDS who has knowingly infected others 13 1 should be iso-
lated. Selective isolation not only would prevent offenders from in-
fecting more people, but also would highlight public concern about the
spread of AIDS and might even deter potential offenders.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1991).
129. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES
ACT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (1991).
130. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.81 (Anderson 1988). A violation of this
statute is a second degree misdemeanor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3701.99 (Anderson
1988).
131. Gaetan Dugas, a Canadian airline steward, is a well-known example. See RANDY
SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON 78-79, 438-39 (1987).
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Some acts by AIDS carriers are regularly prosecuted as violations of
existing criminal laws. For example, several persons have been charged
with assault, attempted assault and reckless endangerment for allegedly
biting or spitting at police or prison officers who tried to restrain them
while they were in custody.13 2 Simply exposing someone other than
one's spouse to HIV infection through sexual activity constitutes a crimi-
nal offense in some states.' 3 3 One court has indicated that a sex act by
an AIDS carrier constitutes assault with a dangerous weapon or at-
tempted murder.134 In 1987, a West German court convicted an Ameri-
can serviceman with AIDS of causing bodily harm with "dangerous
treatment" because he had had intercourse with several partners.l 
3 5
In addition to invoking existing criminal laws in the new context of
AIDS, some states have passed new legislation specific to AIDS trans-
mission. Some forms of AIDS transmission, such as donating blood and
having sexual intercourse without informing the partner, have already
been criminalized.13 6 Future state action criminalizing various forms of
AIDS transmission might include making it a felony to engage in acts of
prostitution while knowing one was infected with HIV, aggravating pun-
ishment for rape committed by someone who knows he is infected with
HIV, and criminalizing sexual intercourse by a knowing AIDS carrier or
the knowing commission of any act a person knows is likely to transmit
AIDS to another.
In the wake of the AIDS epidemic, calls for mandatory testing and
quarantine have mounted. The federal government now tests immi-
grants, federal prisoners, military personnel and federal employees in
the Peace Corps, Job Corps and State Department Foreign Service. The
testing of foreign service personnel was upheld, although the Job Corps'
AIDS testing policy has been challenged.' 3 7 The key question is
whether mandatory testing violates an employee's Fourth Amendment
rights against unreasonable search and seizure. Case law remains un-
clear, though one state case appears to limit the right to require
testing. 138
In addition, numerous states have passed laws that require testing
of prisoners and convicted prostitutes, sex offenders and IV drug
132. Robert 0. Boorstin, Criminal and Civil Litigation on Spread of AIDS Appears, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 1987, at Al.
133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (1990); LA. REV. STAT ANN. § 14:43.5 (1987).
134. Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1989). In this Herpes transmission case,
the court specifically stated that the transmission of AIDS would also be construed as
battery.
135. Serge Schmemann, Bavarian Court Convicts American in AIDS Case, N.Y. TIMES, No-
vember 17, 1987, at A5.
136. FLA. STAT. ANN. 384.24 (West Supp. 1986) prohibits a person infected with HIV
from having sexual intercourse without informing his or her partner of the infection;
IDAHO CODE § 39-601 (1986) prohibits a person with AIDS or an AIDS carrier from know-
ingly or willfully exposing another to AIDS, ARC or HIV; TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-32-104
(1986) prohibits AIDS carriers from donating blood.
137. Doreen Weisenhaus, The Shaping of AIDS Law, NAT'L L.J., August 1, 1988, at 1.
138. Guardianship of Anthony, 524 N.E.2d 1361 (Mass. 1988) (a sexually active re-
tarded man who exhibited no symptoms of AIDS could not be tested for the disease).
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users. 139 Illinois and Louisiana enacted mandatory testing for marriage-
license applicants, but only four of the first 12,000 applicants tested pos-
itive for HIV, while the number of applicants for marriage licenses was
significantly reduced. 1
4 0
Quarantine of persons with AIDS has also been suggested. A 1986
Newsweek poll indicated that fifty-four percent of those surveyed fa-
vored quarantining people with AIDS. 14 1 Proposals for quarantine,
however, represent an outdated medical practice. Quarantine is highly
discretionary and relatively unconstrained by strict norms of notice, fair
warning and due process. Nevertheless, many state health laws enacted
during earlier epidemics were routinely upheld as an appropriate exer-
cise of the state's police power. These laws have been largely unused,
however, because antibiotics have proved more effective than quaran-
tine in stopping most epidemics.
Several states have amended their public health laws to authorize
some form of isolation for some AIDS carriers.14 2 Other possible state
actions might include permitting quarantine of any seropositive HIV
carrier who knowingly exposes another person to the virus and authoriz-
ing quarantine of persons with AIDS and persons suspected of being
infected with HIV pending testing. State lawmakers are likely to allow
public health authorities to quarantine or isolate persons designated as
diseased upon a showing that their conduct exposes others to the dis-
ease and that confinement is necessary to prevent its spread.
The substantive constitutional constraints that apply to criminal
sanctions have not been applied to processes of quarantine, commit-
ment and preventive detention.' 43 Civil commitment, however, may in-
volve greater deprivation of liberty than criminal punishment, 144 and
quarantine of AIDS patients or carriers may violate their right to due
139. Id. at 30.
140. Id. Because of this experience, several states have instituted premarital education
programs in lieu of testing.
141. Growing Concern, Greater Precaution, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 32. In 1986, Cali-
fornia voters defeated a notorious pro-quarantine initiative that would have added AIDS
and exposure to the HIV virus to the list of diseases reportable to the state health authori-
ties. The authorities, in turn, would have been authorized to quarantine persons with
AIDS or AIDS carriers. People living with or visiting AIDS patients or carriers would have
been subject to criminal penalties if they failed to report this contact to public health
authorities.
142. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-1406(2)(c) (Supp. 1991) authorizes public health officials
to order persons infected with HIV whose behavior endangers others to cease and desist,
and in the event that they violate such orders, to apply restrictions necessary to stop them;
IDAHO CODE § 39-601 (1986) adds AIDS, ARC and other manifestations of HIV infection
to the list of diseases subject to quarantine; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 214.410 (Baldwin 1991)
classifies AIDS as a sexually transmitted disease subject to quarantine or isolation.
143. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (civil commitment is not sub-
ject to the constraints of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment). To invoke criminal sanctions would entail a more serious deprivation of
individual liberties than civil sanctions such as quarantine, commitment and preventive
detention.
144. See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (from an alcoholic's point of view,
compulsory commitment for alcoholism "can hardly be considered a less severe penalty"
than jail).
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process and equal protection. In any event, quarantine of persons with
AIDS is unreasonable because the AIDS virus is not easily communi-
cated. 14 5 Quarantine, like isolation and placarding, is an extreme mea-
sure that should be implemented only when no less restrictive
alternative is available to control transmission.1
4 6
A state board of health may have the responsibility to inspect
schools and may close any school for health reasons. 14 7 When a danger-
ous communicable disease is unusually prevalent, as would be the case if
AIDS were to become an epidemic, or a school or community is
threatened with epidemic conditions, an Ohio statute permits the state
board of health to close any school and even prohibit public gatherings
for such time as is necessary. While medical knowledge about AIDS
suggests that this action would be inappropriate, state law neverthess
provides the authority for it in Ohio.'
4 8
IV. THE ROLE OF SCHOOL BOARDS
School board members are vested with management and control of
all the public schools in their district.' 49 Although a school board re-
ceives its power from the state, local boards are given broad authority in
the conduct and management of their schools. 150 Absent gross abuse, a
court has no authority to control the discretion vested in the board or to
substitute its judgment for that of the board.
15 1
A school board should develop policies before an AIDS crisis devel-
145. For a more extensive discussion of the quarantine issue see John A. Gleason,
Quarantine: An Unreasonable Solution to the AIDS Dilemma, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 217 (1986);
Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 53 (1985); Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A. Field, AIDS and the Coercive Power of the
State, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139 (1988).
146. Case law has allowed such restraint of prisoners. For example, a New York court
dismissed an attempt by prisoners who suffered from AIDS to enjoin their segregation
from the general prison population. The court held that segregation of prisoners with
AIDS from the general prison population bore a rational relation to prison officials' objec-
tive of protecting both AIDS sufferers and other prisoners from tension and harm that
could result from other prisoners' fears. Further, the segregation did not inflict cruel and
unusual punishment, deny prisoners with AIDS due process or violate their rights to pri-
vacy, free expression and free association. Cordero v. Coughlin, 607 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
When an inmate with AIDS was denied conjugal visits through the New York Prison
Family Reunion Program, the inmate and his wife brought a mandamus proceeding to
review the ruling and obtain declaratory relief. The court found that an inmate retains
only those rights not inconsistent with the institution and his status. The inmate claimed
that denying him visitation invaded an area of personal decision making. But the court
held that the denial was appropriate as long as prison officials had a rational basis for it. In
this case, prison regulations set forth 15 guidelines for consideration and balancing. The
court noted that the guidelines, many of which were subjective, did not create an entitle-
ment to the conjugal visits, and found, inter alia, that the inmate's AIDS was an appropri-
ate reason for prison officials to deny his conjugal visits. Doe v. Coughlin, 518 N.E.2d 536
(N.Y. Ct. App. 1987).
147. See, e.g., Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 3707.26 (Anderson 1988).
148. Id. Such action may create rather than reduce the mass hysteria and fear of conta-
gion that accompanies AIDS.
149. See, e.g., Omio REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.47 (Anderson 1990).
150. Greco v. Roper, 61 N.E.2d 307 (Ohio 1945).
151. State ex rel. Evans v. Fry, 230 N.E.2d 363 (1967).
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ops. As elected officials, board members are under immediate political
pressure when it becomes public knowledge that a person or child with
AIDS is in school. There is simply no time for rational action once AIDS
hysteria begins. Responsible school board planning in advance is partic-
ularly important because a school board may only take official actions in
concert during an official session. 15 2 An individual board member has
no authority to act on behalf of the entire board.
In developing policies to deal with AIDS, board members should
review state and federal law regarding the treatment of persons with
handicaps or infectious diseases. Although education is not a federal
constitutional right,' 53 it is a right under many state constitutions.
Ohio, for example, provides public education as a right for citizens be-
tween the ages of five and twenty-one; 154 students cannot be deprived of
this right without due process.155 Without these statutory protections,
students with AIDS would have no recourse if a school district excluded
them in the misguided belief that its action is necessary to protect
others.
Financial assistance in meeting the educational needs of handi-
capped children is available to states under P.L. 94-142, the Education
for All Handicapped Children Act. 15 6 Federal assistance also is avail-
able for early childhood education under P.L. 99-457 .157 Some states
have gone beyond the federal statute in providing assistance and protec-
tion for handicapped children. For example, the Ohio Administrative
Code was revised in 1976 to establish an elaborate system of regulations
and statutes regarding the handicapped.
15 8
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act (P.L. 94-142) es-
tablished handicapped children's right to be educated in the same class-
room as nonhandicapped children, when this is feasible. School boards
should consider this "mainstreaming" concept 59 in determining how to
educate children with AIDS, ARC or the HIV antibody. The first issue
to be resolved is whether AIDS would qualify as a handicapping condi-
tion under a provision regarding children who are "health impaired or
who have specific learning disabilities requiring special education.'
160
If a student with AIDS is covered by special education provisions,
the school district is required to provide for all the costs of that stu-
dent's individualized educational plan. In Ohio, this includes "required
related services and instruction specifically designed to meet the unique
needs of a handicapped child, including classroom instruction, home in-
struction, and instruction in hospitals and institutions." 16 ' The concept
152. 68 AM. JuR. 2D Schools § 53 (1973).
153. City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
154. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.48 (Anderson 1990).
155. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.661 (Anderson Supp. 1991).
156. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1485 (1990).
157. Early Education for Handicapped Children, 20 U.S.C. § 1423.
158. OHIO ADMIN. CODE §§ 3301-51-01 to -30 (1990).
159. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (5)(B).
160. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.01(A) (Anderson 1987).
161. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.01(B) (Anderson Supp. 1990).
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of an individualized education program is eminently useful for a child
with AIDS.
Superintendents typically have a statutory right and duty to assign
children. 16 2 Because of this responsibility, the superintendent must
make the difficult decisions regarding the assignment of a student with
AIDS. Each case should be dealt with on an ad hoc basis and each child
should receive adequate substantive and procedural due process.
Before excluding a child with AIDS, a school district should notify the
child and institute a hearing of some kind, based on written board pro-
cedure or policy.
Substantive due process requires that a school district do more than
merely review the facts. It requires the district to listen to the best medi-
cal and legal advice available and then make the best decision possible.
Many school districts have established AIDS panels. Ideally, theses
panels include at least one infectious disease specialist, a county health
official, a medical doctor, a physician for the child with AIDS and an
educator from the school district. 163 With four medical people on such
a panel, the decision on an AIDS case would be likely to reflect the med-
ical community's determination that the risk of AIDS transmission
through casual contact in a school setting is minimal. A disturbing prac-
tice developing in some school districts, however, is to increase the
number of non-medical school district personnel on these panels. Such
panels are likely to favor the school, giving the school district greater
leverage than the child when a sensitive AIDS decision must be made.
This practice could create potential legal problems. If educators base
their decisions solely on educational, rather than informed medical
grounds, ignoring medical experts' testimony, their decisions may not
hold up in the lawsuits to which they are likely to give rise.
The future regarding AIDS and the schools is far from bright. Most
persons with AIDS, children included, will face discrimination and ill-
treatment. Children will continue to face legal battles to stay in school,
and teachers and staff will continue to lose their jobs. Discriminatory
practices will increase as the fear and trauma of potential infection from
AIDS is amplified and inflamed by the news media and imaginary fears.
School systems must be at the forefront of concern and change, if for no
other reason than the length of AIDS incubation. With a seven-to-ten
year dormancy period (some studies indicate that it might be fifteen
years or more), 164 many of those unknowingly infected with the virus
will have children. Many of these children born with AIDS will enter
schools in the mid-1990s.
A fundamental underpinning of our federal system is the belief that
162. See, e.g., OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.01 (Anderson 1990).
163. The author discussed the proposed procedure with dozens of school superintend-
ents at the 1991 American Association of School Administrators conference in New Orle-
ans, La., March 2, 1991 during an open forum session. The consensus was that a medical
panel recommendation was the best tactic, and in fact, the superintendents' school attor-
neys had recommended it.
164. Health Benefits, supra note 9.
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the federal government should help with problems that are too big for
local government to handle. This philosophy has resulted in federal ini-
tiatives in areas of defense, commerce and civil rights. At present, how-
ever, no federal law deals with AIDS and no federal plan addresses the
AIDS crisis, despite the fact that a report by the Presidential Commis-
sion on AIDS called for sweeping measures, including voluntary testing
and anti-discrimination laws.1 6 5 Courts are still struggling with the ap-
propriate application of the Rehabilitation Act to persons with AIDS,
and while an explosion of litigation has occurred in state courts, federal
courts have provided little guidance.
Present state and federal laws may protect people with AIDS who
hold public sector positions, but in far too many states, individuals in
private sector jobs have only limited protection. At first glance, protec-
tive legislation for people with AIDS may not seem as important as
assistance in fighting the disease itself. Unfortunately, this is a short-
sighted view. Persons with AIDS and their families-who also are not
assured that they are secure in their jobs and apartments and safe from
quarantine-will not come forward for testing and treatment. Because
the threat of discrimination makes it unrealistic for a person to volunteer
to be tested for AIDS before having children, many asymptomatic carri-
ers will continue to have children who are born with the virus. Thus, the
number of infected people will continue to grow, and the number of
children with AIDS will continue to increase.
In the fifties, the dangers of drugs were featured in federal reports,
journal articles and local publicity, yet we did nothing because vested
interests were not affected. Drugs, it was said, were a black ghetto prob-
lem that did not concern the "good" kids. The result of this avoidance
is that we now have a drug problem that is beyond the ability of any city,
state or even the federal government to resolve. Similarly, the much
needed, far-reaching federal AIDS initiative will not occur as long as
people believe that AIDS is only a disease of homosexuals and drug
abusers.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations regarding AIDS policies, practices
and procedures are intended for school boards, administrators, teachers
and staff to use as they develop local practices. The recommended poli-
cies and procedures may help school officials avoid serious legal and
community problems without jeopardizing the rights of people with
AIDS.
AIDS policies must be in place in advance of a potentially critical
situation. A school district has no time to develop a well-reasoned series
of actions after an AIDS emergency develops, and community pressure
and concern may lead to incorrect and possibly illegal actions. An AIDS
advisory team composed predominately of medical experts should be in
165. See Weisenhaus, supra note 137, at I.
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place to recommend actions to the superintendent and school board.
Expert medical advice is critical in protecting and insulating the school
district, as well as in protecting the rights of a person with AIDS. An
AIDS advisory team should include the child's or employee's doctor as
well as county and district medical officials and a district educational
representative.
A school district should communicate its AIDS policies and the un-
derlying rationale to the public before a crisis occurs. For example, the
public may be informed that medical evidence has ruled out transmis-
sion of AIDS by casual social contact and that there is no evidence of
virus transmission within the classroom situation. This practice serves
as a community education program and provides a basis for avoiding
panic reactions if a crisis occurs.
As a general rule, discrimination against a person with AIDS in a
school setting is irrational, unreasonable and probably unlawful as long
as medical research continues to demonstrate that AIDS cannot be con-
tracted through casual social contact. A school board should not trans-
fer or fire a seropositive student or employee, or one with ARC or AIDS,
merely because of that person's medical status. The medical team's rec-
ommendations should be the controlling factor in a decision regarding
transfer or termination. Recent court action 16 6 indicates that transfer
should only occur after a medical team decision based on the communi-
cability and risk of transmission of the AIDS virus. Rarely, if ever,
should a student be turned away or a school employee be fired because
of medical status.
A school district should always explore the options of home instruc-
tion for a student and assignment to a nonteaching position for an em-
ployee. Student and staff may actually prefer an alternative in which
they are not involved with the public and thereby avoid exposure to op-
portunistic infections. If the parents of the student with AIDS accept
home instruction, or if an employee is willing to accept an assignment to
a nonteaching position, the district is relieved of responsibility and
liability.
Even when parents opt for home instruction, a school district must
allow a child with AIDS to attend school. A child has a right to be edu-
cated among his or her peers. An exception should be made only when
the child is a danger to others, as in the case of a young child with AIDS
who has a history of biting others.
A school district may not exclude an employee because of the
"fear" that he or she will spread the AIDS virus. Arline settled this ques-
tion. 16 7 An employer may not discriminate simply because of an un-
founded fear of transmission. Only when there is convincing evidence
that a person with AIDS is a threat to others may an employer take pro-
166. Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988); see supra notes
65-78 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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tective action. Fear of contagion, alone, is not enough to justify
discrimination.
An employer may not terminate an employee with AIDS without
convincing evidence of a threat of contagion, but the same employer
must take care in acting against people who object to continued employ-
ment with a person with AIDS. Workers engaged in "concerted activ-
ity" are protected by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 16 8
whether or not they are members of a collective bargaining unit. There-
fore, a school district may not arbitrarily terminate employees who com-
plain about the perceived safety hazard of working with a person with
AIDS. Of course, the employees must be reasonable in their beliefs and
act in good faith. Since the medical facts at this time indicate that the
disease is transmissible only through intimate physical contact, which
would not occur in the performance of an employee's job, a court proba-
bly would find that fear of AIDS in this situation is not reasonable. Fur-
thermore, the NLRA probably would not protect a "concerted activity"
where the person with AIDS had previously been defined as handi-
capped, since a handicapped person is protected from discrimination
under state and federal law.
Treating individuals with AIDS or ARC differently from those who
are seropositive is an equal protection violation. It would be unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory for a school board to terminate an employee or
exclude a student with a given AIDS-linked condition while treating
those in another category differently. Excluding all categories of AIDS
victims also would fail. While education is not a "fundamental right,"
states that choose to provide a public education must make equal serv-
ices available to all. Again, the behavior and physical condition of the
person with AIDS must be the determining factor.
School district and employee insurance policies should be ex-
amined to determine the extent of coverage and protection. In most
cases, insurance plans exclude or limit benefits for a pre-existing injury
or sickness. Thus, an insurance company must continue to provide cov-
erage for an individual who contracts AIDS during his or her employ-
ment, with no prior knowledge, as it does for a person who contracts
cancer while employed. Some insurance companies have used a positive
antibody test to justify denying coverage. This practice appears to be a
departure from traditional group underwriting practices and therefore
may trigger a charge of employment discrimination.
An AIDS condition should be kept confidential whenever a question
arises as to whether information should be released. Confidentiality is
implicated when an AIDS test is required, when an employee notifies the
district of a positive test result and when a child with AIDS enters the
school system. These results must not be released without consent, nor
should they be used to determine insurability or suitability for employ-
ment. State laws vary, but revealing medical information could be a
168. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947).
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clear invasion of the privacy of a student or employee. The general pol-
icy should be that if there is no need to fear AIDS, there is no rational
reason to intrude on the right to privacy of a person with AIDS.
A school district must make a reasonable effort to accommodate an
employee with AIDS. Because persons with advanced AIDS are likely to
be considered handicapped, employers must make reasonable accom-
modations for their physical or mental limitations, unless those accom-
modations would impose an undue hardship-not merely an
inconvenience-on the employer's business. Since AIDS is not spread
by casual social contact, a school district would find it difficult to argue
undue hardship.
A school district should take immediate action to eliminate or cur-
tail students' drug activity, since the fastest growing cause of AIDS infec-
tion is intravenous drug use, and to initiate and sustain AIDS-prevention
education programs. Teenagers are a high-risk group for AIDS because
they tend to experiment with sex and drugs. Their impulsive behavior
and lack of knowledge about long-term consequences make them espe-
cially vulnerable. A comprehensive program of AIDS education, which
enhances personal awareness and instructs students on protective be-
havior, may reduce the number of students who acquire the disease.
Since the incidence of AIDS among Hispanics and Blacks is far higher
than in the general population, 169 education programs should include
specialized AIDS instruction for minority children, geared to their cul-
tural values.
Staff development programs focusing on AIDS education should be
instituted at the same time as AIDS-prevention education programs for
students. Many teachers are unaware of many facts about AIDS and
many also are unable to deal with the complexity of students' concern
and questions about AIDS prevention. Most adults are simply not com-
fortable talking about such AIDS concerns as anal intercourse, safe sex,
and condom use. Only through proper in-service training, followed by
on-going staff development based on open communication, will teachers
develop the knowledge and ability to share critical AIDS information
with students. Teachers and all staff who communicate with students
should receive this training.
CONCLUSION
The present attitude of many people regarding AIDS is similar to
the prevalent attitude in the 1950s regarding drugs. Religious funda-
mentalists are not the only ones who believe that AIDS may be a punish-
ment for the sexual behavior of homosexuals or for the excesses of
intravenous drug abusers. Medical science has established, however,
that AIDS attacks everyone, not just homosexuals and drug addicts. Un-
fortunately, the "democratic" nature of the AIDS virus will so com-
pound the problem that even comprehensive federal legislation may
169. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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come too late to save most people who are infected by AIDS. The costs
will be astronomical. Our health providers may be unable to meet the
nationwide need. Likewise, our social systems-including public school
systems-are ill-prepared to meet the interpersonal needs of AIDS pa-
tients, their families, and a hysterical public. The national will seems
'inadequate to provide both a coordinated federal AIDS effort and a
stronger research effort; it may not even be strong enough to force
lawmakers to enact additional supportive legislation.
The only realistic solution is prevention, and prevention requires
education. Children are educated both at home and in school. With a
comprehensive awareness program, the spread of both diseases, AIDS
and AFRAIDS, can be slowed. Children will learn if they are taught ef-
fectively. Teaching about AIDS requires a sincere effort and a general
acceptance of the lessons to be learned.170 This is possible, but who will
teach the parents, teachers and administrators who teach the children?
Whither our future?
170. For additional information on schools and AIDS, see the following: Leah Ham-
mett, Protecting Children with AIDS Against Arbitrary Exclusion from School, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1373 (1986); Edward Knox Proctor, Delconte v. State: Some Thoughts on Home Education, 64
N.C. L. REV. 1302 (1986); Frederick A. 0. SchwartzJr. & Frederick P. Schaffer, AIDS in the
Classroom, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 163 (1985); Lisa J. Sotto, Undoing a Lesson of Fear in the
Classroom: The Legal Recourse of AIDS-Linked Children, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1986); Mat-
thewJ. Welker, The Impact of AIDS Upon Public Schools: A Problem forJurisprudence, 33 EDUC.
L. REP. 603 (1986).
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